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NOTE
UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO:
THE PARIAH OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Rubin Gottesman, the operator of X-Citement Video in Van
Nuys, California, was convicted for his interstate distribution of several
pornographic videotapes, including Lust in the Fast Lane, starring a minor'
performing under the name of Traci Lords.' Despite the overwhelming
evidence that Gottesman intended to distribute child pornography, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction holding that section
2252 of the Child Protection Act,3 the statute used to convict Gottesman,
was unconstitutional on its face.4
1. Section 2256(1) of the Child Protection Act defines a "minor" as any person under the
age of 18. See infra note 53.
2. Ron Russell, Law on Child Pornography Struck Down, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A3.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1993) provides:
(a) Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails any visual depiction, if -
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or
transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces
any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or through the mails, if -
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(b)(1) ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both ....
4. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992). A statute
will be found to be facially invalid if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable
area of [government] control, but.., sweeps within its ambit other activities that... constitute
an exercise" of protected rights. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
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In 1977, Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act5 to prohibit the distribution of obscene6 pornography
depicting minors. In 1984, Congress amended the Act, lowering the
standard for the prohibited material from "obscene" to "sexually explicit."7
Application of the amended Act has been problematic, however, because
it holds both distributors and recipients of videotapes containing child
pornography strictly liable with respect to the contents of the tapes. As a
result, even if a distributor honestly believes that none of the videotapes
distributed contain child pornography, if a single videotape contains a scene
depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct, that distributor is in violation
of section 2252 of the Child Protection Act.8
Distributors of adult pornography are the statute's most vulnerable
targets. The burden upon distributors to accurately determine the age of
every performer in each videotape is insurmountable. As a result, many
distributors of adult pornography have chosen to leave the business of
distribution entirely, for fear of violating the statute.9
In deciding X-Citement Video, the Ninth Circuit panel'0 unanimously
agreed that section 2252 was unconstitutional without a mens rea"
5. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92
Stat. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2257 (1978)).
6. "Obscene" is defined as anything that is "[o]bjectionable or offensive to accepted
standards of decency." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (6th ed. 1990). The U.S. Supreme
Court has also created guidelines for determining when material is deemed "obscene." See infra
note 81.
7. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4(3), 98 Stat. 204 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 98 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1984)).
8. Id.
9. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
10. The panel included Judge William C. Canby, Jr., Judge Alex Kozinski and Judge
Ferdinand F. Fernandez. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1286.
11. "Mens rea" literally means "guilty mind." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed.
1990). The degrees of mens rea, from highest to lowest, are "purpose," "knowledge," "reckless,"
"negligence," and "strict liability." Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of
Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 574 n.24 (1992).
The Model Penal Code defines these degrees of mens rea as follows:
(1) Purpose - A person acts purposefully with respect to a result or to conduct described
by a statute when his/her conscious objective is to cause such result or
engage in such conduct. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
(2) Knowledge - A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance
described by a statute when he/she is aware that his/her conduct is
of such nature or that such circumstances exist. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(b)(i).
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requirement with respect to the age of the performers in the videotapes.'
2
A statute that holds distributors and recipients of child pornography strictly
liable for their actions could deter people from distributing protected adult
pornography. 3 Generally, strict liability is employed as a "procedural
shortcut to punish those who would be culpable under traditional theories
of criminal law."14 However, strict liability statutes "cannot be applied in
settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of
expression, by making the individual the [sic] more reluctant to exercise
it." 5 Although adult pornography may not be the first thing that comes
to mind when one thinks of protected free speech, it remains a protected,
albeit unconventional, form of expression.'
6
The X-Citement Video panel was primarily faced with two issues: (1)
what degree of mens rea was required for section 2252 to be valid; and (2)
whether the court could save section 2252 from invalidation through
judicial construction.1 7  The majority in X-Citement Video found that
section 2252, without a mens rea of at least "knowledge," creates an
undesirable "chilling effect" on the distribution of adult pornography.
8
(3) Reckless - A person acts recklessly when he/she is aware of and consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that will result from his/her conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to hiniher, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c).
(4) Negligence- A person is criminally negligent when he/she fails to perceive the substantial
and unjustifiable risk that will result from his/her conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
him/her, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(d).
STANLEY S. ARKIN & JOHN R. WING, MENS REA STATE OF MIND DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL AND
CrVIL FRAUD CASES 173-75 (1985).
12. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1291-92. But see Jon Axel Holl, Comment, Judges,
Congress, and the Sixteen-Year-Old Porn Star: Questions on the Proper Role of the First
Amendment, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1355 (1990) (arguing that § 2252 should be enforced as a strict
liability statute).
13. As one commentator suggested, strict liability could "deter producers from making adult
films." Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 409 (1993) (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 421.
15. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
16. Holl, supra note 12, at 1356.
17. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1286.
18. Id. at 1291.
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Judge Alex Kozinski, however, disagreed with the court's invalidation
of section 2252." In his partial dissent, Judge Kozinski proposed that
under traditional rules of statutory construction, a "reckless" mental state
could be read into the statute so that it would not infringe upon the First
Amendment right to free speech.20
This Note will focus on the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of section
2252 of the Child Protection Act. It is the author's opinion that the Ninth
Circuit should have saved section 2252 by judicially narrowing the scope
of the statute to require a mens rea with respect to the contents of the
material distributed or received. Part II of this Note examines the First
Amendment and the background of the Child Protection Act. Part I
outlines the facts of X-Citement Video, the Ninth Circuit's reasons for
invalidating section 2252, and the majority's improper reliance on the law
governing obscenity cases. Part IV argues that, in order to save section
2252 from invalidation, the Ninth Circuit should have either judicially
narrowed the scope of section 2252 to require a mens rea element of
criminal negligence with respect to the contents of the material, or, in the
alternative, created a mistake-of-age defense. Part V analyzes the effect
this decision has had on subsequent decisions involving section 2252 and
how the Ninth Circuit has expanded the scope of the X-Citement Video
decision to apply retroactively.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment
When determining the degree of protection to grant speech, courts
weigh the value of the speech itself against the harm it causes." The
value allocated to various forms of speech depends on the subject
matter.' For example, political speech or discourse receives special
protection commercial speech receives less protection, and obscene speech
receives no protection at all.23 In addition, as the Ninth Circuit pointed
out, "[t]he distaste we may feel as individuals toward the content or
message of protected expression cannot ... detain us from discharging our
19. Id. at 1292.
20. Id.
21. Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected
Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1992).
22. Id. at 1891-92.
23. Id. at 1892, 1894.
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duty as guardians of the Constitution."2 4 The constitutional rights of those
involved in pornography were first considered by the United States
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.' In Chaplinsky, the
Court first recognized that certain classes of speech do not receive the
protection of the First Amendment.26 The Court expressly excluded lewd
and obscene speech as outside the First Amendment's protective umbrel-
la.27
This holding was solidified fifteen years later in Roth v. United
States.28 In Roth, the Court attempted to lower the minimum standards
for the exclusion of sexually explicit material from the ambit of First
Amendment protection.2 9 The Court announced a definition that distin-
guished protected speech from unprotected obscenity: "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."3
This definition resulted in pornography receiving greater protection, some
of which had only the slightest portion of redeeming social value.3'
Sixteen years after Roth, the Court decided Miller v. California,32 in
which it enunciated a less protective standard for determining what is
obscene.33
Despite the Court's elimination of obscenity as a protected form of
expression, non-obscene pornography remains a protected class of speech.
Although the harms generated by pornography are serious,34 they are
insufficient, standing alone, to justify complete government prohibition.
In fact, pornography has been traditionally classified as political discourse,
24. United States v. United States Dist. Court ("Kantor"), 858 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988).
25. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. Id. at 571.
27. Il at 572.
28. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
29. Todd J. Weiss, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the First
Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 349 (1985).
30. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
31. Weiss, supra note 29.
32. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
33. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
34. The reasoning behind antipornography legislation is found in three categories
of concrete, gender-related harms: harms to those who participate in the production
of pornography, harms to the victims of sex crimes that would not have been
committed in the absence of pornography, and harms to society through social
conditioning that fosters discrimination and other unlawful activities.
Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 595 (1986).
35. Id. at 602; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that non-
obscene speech cannot be regulated because of the harm it produces unless it is shown that the
speech is directed to produce harm that is both imminent and extremely likely to occur).
1994]
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and therefore is subject to protection.36 At first glance, this may seem
absurd. However, upon closer scrutiny, pornography often conveys many
political messages which have great impact on societal values. For
example, the subordination of women in pornography extends a sexist
message about the role of women in society.37 It has been argued that
this message does not remain solely in the viewers' minds, but instead
affects many different aspects of their lives.38 Pornography may also
reinforce values of hedonism or anti-establishment sentiments.39 Even
violent pornography can be said to endorse the concept of uninhibited and
uncommitted sex, in other words, sex just for pleasure.40 Although not all
forms of pornography can be classified as political speech, non-obscene
pornography continues to be a protected form of expression, so long as it
does not involve minors.
B. The Child Protection Act
In the 1970s, an explosive growth in child pornography occurred. By
1977, child pornography had become a significant part of mainstream
commercial pornography.4' The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded
that child pornography had become a "highly organized, multimillion dollar
industr[y] that operate[s] on a nationwide scale." 42 Prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children became an increasingly serious national
concern.43 As a result of "growing pressure to eliminate child pornogra-
36. Harel, supra note 21, at 1895-96. But see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959)
(holding that sexually explicit speech, such as pornography, is generally afforded the same
protection as commercial speech, and is distinguishable from other more meritorious types of
speech).
37. See Harel, supra note 21, at 1896. Recently, some feminists have attacked adult
pornography from a civil rights perspective, claiming that it leads to the discrimination and
subordination of women. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DIscouRsEs ON LwrE AND LAW (1987). However, this argument is self-defeating in that it admits
that pornography conveys a political message, and therefore deserves heightened protection.
38. Harel, supra note 21, at 1897.
39. See Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography
as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1627 (1988).
40. Deana Pollard, Regulating Violent Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REV. 125, 137 (1990).
41. A'r'Y GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL RP. 599-601 (1986).
42. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42.
43. Weiss, supra note 29.
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phy,"44 Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977.' 5
The 1977 Act, however, proved difficult to enforce. First, it required
that the videotapes distributed were produced for a commercial purpose,
thereby allowing those who produced child pornography for personal uses
to avoid prosecution.' Second, it prohibited distribution of only "ob-
scene" child pornography.47 As a result, non-commercial production and
distribution of "non-obscene" child pornography flourished, while very few
convictions were obtained.48
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber49
upheld a New York law that made it illegal to distribute "non-obscene"
child pornography. The Court stated that "[t]he legislative judgment...
is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful
to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That
judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment."5
This decision "established child pornography as a separate form of sexually
explicit speech whose production and distribution the states may prohibit
without resorting to the test for legal obscenity."5 It also provided the
springboard for Congress to pass the Child Protection Act of 1984.52
The 1984 Act effected a number of major changes designed to
facilitate the prosecution and enforcement of child pornography laws. The
most significant change from the 1977 Act was the elimination of the
obscenity and commercial purpose requirements." Despite Congress'
44. Robert R. Strang, Note, "She Was Just Seventeen... and the Way She Looked Was Way
Beyond [Her Years]": Child Pornography and Overbreadth, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1779, 1782
(1990).
45. Pub. L. No. 95-225, supra note 5.
46. ATr'Y GEN.'S REP., supra note 41, at 604.
47. Id. at 605.
48. ATr'y GEN.'s REP., supra note 41, at 604-05. In 1982, a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General of the Criminal Division revealed that the Attorney General's office was able to obtain
only twenty-three convictions for selling child pornography since the enactment of the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 500.
49. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
50. Id. at 758.
51. Susan G. Caughlan, Private Possession of Child Pornography: The Tensions Between
Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 202 (1987).
52. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4, 98 Stat. 204 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 98.
53. Id. § 4. Incidentally, the 1984 Act also increased the age of majority from 16 to 18.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (1993). Part of the rationale for increasing the age of majority from 16 to
18 was articulated by Congressman Hughes, the Act's sponsor, who noted that "with this change,
perhaps we can actually protect children up to age 16." 129 CONG. REc. H458 (1983) (Rep.
1994]
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good faith attempt to combat a well-established societal harm, it went too
far in its desire to create optimal enforcement when it created section 2252
without a mens rea requirement as to the age of the performers.
The legislative history of the 1977 Act explicitly provides that it is not
necessary to prove that a defendant knew that the videotapes contained
child pornography.' When the Act was amended in 1984, the legislative
history was silent as to what level of proof was required." In X-Citement
Video, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether the statute should be
invalidated or judicially narrowed by adding a mens rea requirement or a
mistake-of-age defense. 6
III. THE CASE: UNITED STATES V. X-CITEMENT VIDEO
A. The Facts
In 1986 and 1987, an undercover police officer contacted Rubin
Gottesman, the operator of a video store, and asked to purchase videotapes
starring Traci Lords.57 The officer specifically stated "that he wanted
tapes that Lords had made when she was under the age of 18."" 8
Gottesman sold the officer two sets of tapes; one set he gave directly to the
officer and the second set Gottesman shipped, per the officer's instructions,
to Hawaii. 9
"A federal grand jury indicted Gottesman for distributing, shipping,
and conspiring to distribute and ship child pornography in violation" 60 of
the Child Protection Act. After a bench trial, a federal district court in Los
Angeles convicted Gottesman of violating sections 2252(a)(1) and (a)(2) of
the Child Protection Act, sentenced him to twelve months incarceration and
fined him $100,000.61 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that section
Hughes of New Jersey).
54. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 69.
55. H.R. REP. No. 536,98thCong., 2d Sess. 12 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492,
503.
56. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1285.
57. Id. at 1286.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Conviction of Distributor of Traci Lords Videotapes is Overturned as Court, Over Strong
Dissent, Declares Section of Child Pornography Statute Unconstitutional, 15 ENT. L. REP. 1, 11
(1993).
61. Id.
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2252 was facially unconstitutional and reversed the district court's
decision.62
B. The Reasoning
Judge Canby, writing for the majority in X-Citement Video, relied on
an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Thomas,63 to conclude
that "section 2252 does not require any knowledge of the contents of the
material; the only scienter requirement of section 2252 is the defendant's
knowledge that he mailed the material."'  Moreover, relying on the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Smith v. California,65 and New
York v. Ferber,66 the majority determined that "the First Amendment
mandates that a statute prohibiting the distribution, shipping or receipt of
child pornography require knowledge of the minority of the performers as
an element of the crime it defines."
67
In X-Citement Video, Judge Kozinski dissented with respect to the
majority's position on section 2252.68 First, Judge Kozinski argued that
United States v. Thomas did not hold that section 2252(a) is a strict liability
statute,69 only that Thomas simply tells us that "the word 'knowingly' in
the statute does not apply to the age of the depicted children.' 70 Hence,
Judge Kozinski argued, the Thomas ruling "neither considered nor excluded
the possibility that a lower level of scienter, like recklessness, might apply
as a matter of constitutional interpretation. 71  Second, Judge Kozinski
acknowledged that Ferber holds that criminal responsibility may not be
imposed without some requirement of mens rea, "[b]ut Ferber did not say
what level of scienter is sufficient in a child pornography case - whether
it be purposefulness, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, or something
else altogether."72  Moreover, Judge Kozinski contended, "[w]e know,
62. Id.
63. 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990). Thomas was convicted of mailing obscene material in
violation of § 2252(a)(1). Id. at 1067. The Court held that the government was not required to
allege that Thomas knew the victim was a minor to satisfy § 2252(a)(1). Id. at 1070.
64. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1289.
65. 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (holding that book distributor in possession of obscene book
can only be prosecuted if distributor has knowledge of contents of book).
66. 458 U.S. 747,765 (1982) (holding that "[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility
may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant.").
67. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1291-92 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1292 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1295.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1292 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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after Osborne, that recklessness is sufficient, but it is not at all clear that
a lesser state of mind, such as negligence, would not suffice to save the
statute.
' 73
C. The Court's Reliance Upon Obscenity Law
In making its determination that section 2252 should require
knowledge of the contents of the material, the majority in X-Citement Video
relied upon Smith v. California,74 an adult obscenity case.75 In Smith,
the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits prosecution of a book
distributor for possession of an obscene book unless the distributor has
knowledge of the contents of the book.76  The majority in X-Citement
Video used the holding in New York v. Ferber77 to support its reliance
upon Smith.75 The Ferber Court held that "[a]s with obscenity laws,
criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of
scienter on the part of the defendant. '79 But the Ferber Court also stated
that "[t]he test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity
standard ... 2 0 This finding created the beginning of a new class of
prohibited speech - child pornography.
Before Ferber, the production or distribution of non-obscene child
pornography was protected by the First Amendment. In 1973, the United
States Supreme Court set forth guidelines for determining obscenity in
Miller v. California.81 To most, the idea of child pornography may itself
seem obscene. However, the guidelines created by Miller were of little use
to those attempting to prohibit child pornography. For example, a film
73. Id. at 1296 n.8 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
(upholding a statute that outlawed the possession of child pornography where the defendant either
knew the videotapes contained underage actors or was at least reckless as to this fact). See infra
notes 87 through 94 and accompanying text.
74. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
75. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1290.
76. Smith, 361 U.S. at 153.
77. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
78. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1290.
79. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
80. Id. at 764.
81. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The guidelines for the trier of fact were:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Il at 24 (citations omitted).
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depicting two minors engaged in sexual intercourse would not be
considered obscene under the Miller test if a jury decides that the film is
not offensive or has some significant artistic value.
In 1984, the Ferber Court stated that the standard set forth in Miller
"bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has beenphysically or
psychologically harmed in the production of the work."82 The Court in
Ferber used these harms as its rationale for establishing child pornography
as a separate and completely prohibited form of expression whose
distribution the states may prohibit regardless of whether the material
would be deemed "obscene. ' 83 Moreover, the Court in Ferber stated that
preventing the sexual exploitation of children through their performances
in child pornography is of "surpassing importance," which suggests that
the government has a greater interest in legislating conduct that involves
minors. 5 Hence, with a greater government interest, the need for a mens
rea requirement is diminished in child pornography cases.8 6
The difference in scienter requirements for child pornography and
obscenity was recently recognized in Osborne v. Ohio.87 In this case, the
Court upheld a statute that made possession of child pornography illegal.88
The statute allowed a conviction when a defendant was at least reckless
with respect to the age of the performers in the videotape(s) possessed.89
Osborne argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was
overbroad without requiring that the possessor of child pornography have
a guilty mind.9" However, the Court held that recklessness "plainly
satisfie[d] the requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child
pornography include some element of scienter."9' The Court also noted
that the state's strong interest in preventing child pornography was far more
compelling than the weak interest of preventing obscenity.92
As Judge Kozinski pointed out, Osborne could be distinguished from
X-Citement Video because it involved the possession of child pornography,
while X-Citement Video involved the distribution of child pornography.
93
82. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
83. Caughlan, supra note 51, at 202 n.128.
84. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
85. Strang, supra note 44, at 1797.
86. Id.
87. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 112.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 115.
92. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
93. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1293 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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However, if a mens rea of recklessness would be sufficient to convict a
defendant for the private possession of child pornography, surely the same
standard would be enough to convict a defendant for distributing child
pornography through interstate commerce. It is well settled that the
Constitution affords greater protection to the private possession of material
than it does to material sent through interstate commerce. 4
Although obscenity and child pornography cases have many
similarities, courts should not rely on obscenity decisions when analyzing
the mens rea required by section 2252. The basis for regulating the
distribution of obscene material comes from society's "interest in order and
morality., 95 On the other hand, "[t]he interest at stake [in child pornogra-
phy cases] - protection of children from the extreme and lasting emotional
harm caused by their performances" - is much more substantial.96
Accordingly, the majority's reliance in X-Citement Video upon Smith v.
California to find that a defendant must have at least "knowledge" that the
material contains child pornography was misplaced.
IV. SAVING THE STATUTE
The question remains whether the Ninth Circuit, through judicial
construction, could have narrowed section 2252 by adding a mens rea
requirement. Some believe that "[c]ourts should [either] strike down a
statute as unconstitutional or let it stand."'97 They argue that "[u]nauthor-
ized meddling into the detailed mechanics of carefully drafted statutes is an
intolerable exercise in judicial one-upmanship.""'g With respect to section
2252, some commentators believe that the legislature's decision to drop
"knowledge" from the statute in 1977, and the silence of "the legislative
history of the 1984 Amendment precludes the judicial creation of a scienter
requirement as a matter of statutory interpretation." 99 On the other hand,
Judge Kozinski, in X-Citement Video, noted that while "Congress did delete
a knowledge requirement .... I do not read this as precluding any and all
scienter requirements."'" Moreover, he stated that "[s]tatutes often fail
94. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch.").
95. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
96. Strang, supra note 44, at 1802.
97. Holl, supra note 12, at 1367.
98. Id.
99. Strang, supra note 44, at 1780.
100. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1297 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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to specify mental states for each element of the criminal offense, and courts
routinely read scienter into a statute even absent constitutional consider-
ations." 101
A general rule of American criminal law is that every crime must
include a mens rea and an actus reus, 102 i.e., the "concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand...."'03 When a statute does not
expressly provide a mens rea requirement for all elements of a crime, the
general rule is that the mens rea required for some elements will be
presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless a clear legislative
intent to the contrary exists."1° With respect to section 2252, the statute
expressly requires defendants have knowledge of their distribution, receipt,
or shipment of the material. However, the legislative history clearly
indicates that knowledge is not required with respect to the contents of the
material itself. 5 Hence, the presumption of mens rea set forth by the
Model Penal Code and adopted by many of the states is not applicable
here, where there is clear legislative intent to exclude knowledge from the
content element of the statute.
The modem interpretation of criminal statutes involves an element-by-
element analysis." This analysis recognizes the different states of mind
that may apply to different elements of a crime."° When performing this
analysis, courts separate the elements of a statute into three classes:
conduct, surrounding circumstances, and prohibited result. 8  If an
element is classified as conduct, then only mental states of purpose or
knowledge may apply.1t 9 For example, section 2252 requires that a
defendant have knowledge of the prohibited conduct. On the other hand,
if an element is classified as a surrounding circumstance of a prohibited
result, then any of the four levels of mens rea may apply.' According-
101. Id. at 1296 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (referring to Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 426 (1985)).
102. "Actus reus" literally means "guilty act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 36 (6th ed.
1990).
103. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
104. Matthew T. Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, Comment, United States v. Nofziger and the
Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of
Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 803, 812 (1990).
105. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 69.
106. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985).
107. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 (1980).
108. Pricker & Gilchrist, supra note 104, at 826.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985).
110. Id.
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ly, when analyzing section 2252, the fact that the material is child
pornography would clearly be a surrounding circumstance, and therefore
any level of mens rea would be appropriate, including negligence.
A. Criminal Negligence
The question then turns to which level of mens rea would be the most
appropriate. This determination requires balancing First Amendment rights
with the importance of protecting the victims of child pornography. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated its belief that the "use of children
as ... subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the
children and the society as a whole.... In fact, studies show that
sexually exploited children have difficulty developing healthy, affectionate
relationships later in life and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as
adults.11 2 Moreover, since videotapes create a "permanent record" of the
sexual exploitation and abuse, distribution of these tapes creates an ongoing
harm that could potentially continue for years after the initial abuse."'
This is why preventing the distribution of child pornography is of such
great importance. Considering this potential harm to children, the Ninth
Circuit should not have been so quick to invalidate section 2252.
Instead, in light of the important purpose behind the statute and the
need to deter distribution of child pornography, the Ninth Circuit should
have looked past Osborne and the Model Penal Code and implied a
requirement of negligence with respect to the content of the material in
section 2252. "A criminal negligence standard [much like strict liability]
• .. shifts the risk to the party engaging in the activity [i.e. pornography
distribution] and punishes those who act carelessly."" 4 However, unlike
strict liability, a criminal negligence standard would allow a jury to decide
whether the defendant acted as a reasonable person would under the
circumstances.
Assume a defendant sells or distributes pornographic videotapes and
claims to be unaware of the fact that any of the videos contain child
pornography. Under a criminal negligence standard, the defendant will
only be found guilty if a jury believes that his lack of awareness fell below
that of a reasonable person.
111. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,
43.
112. Ulrich C. Schoettle, M.D., Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 296 (1980).
113. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
114. Levenson, supra note 13, at 420.
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This approach is better than reading a reckless mental state into the
statute, as Judge Kozinski suggested, because negligence is not a state of
mind. Rather, it is a standard of conduct the defendants are expected to
maintain regardless of their state of mind. In fact, the criminally negligent
offender, unlike the reckless offender, is completely unaware of the risk
created, and therefore cannot be guilty of consciously disregarding it."
5
Instead, "[t]he liability stems from a culpable failure to perceive the
risk... 6  Hence, by requiring a mens rea of negligence, section 2252
would survive First Amendment review, and at the same time, preserve
judicial economy by limiting a defendant's opportunity to provide evidence
of his state of mind. As Judge Kozinski noted, the drafters of the child
pornography statute would surely have chosen a statute with a mens rea
requirement over no statute at all.
117
B. The "Mistake-of-Age" Defense
As an alternative to narrowing section 2252 by adding a mens rea
requirement, the Ninth Circuit could have created a "mistake-of-age"
defense."' With this defense, mens rea would still be a factor in
determining whether the statute was violated, but the burden of proof
would be on the defendant."9 With respect to section 2252, a mistake-
of-age defense would permit a defendant to prevail if he could prove that
he honestly and reasonably believed that none of the videotapes he
distributed, received, or shipped contained child pornography.
A classic example of this approach was used in the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. United States District Court for the Central
District of California ("Kantor").2 0 This 1988 case also involved the
notorious Traci Lords, except the issue here was whether the producers,
rather than the distributors, could be held strictly liable with respect to
Lords' age.'2' Writing for the majority this time, Judge Kozinski
115. STANLEY S. ARKIN & JOHN R. WING, MENS REA STATE OF MIND DEFENSES IN
CRlMINAL AND CIVIL FRAUD CASES 178 (1985).
116. l.
117. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1295 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
118. The mistake-of-age defense is simply a type of mistake-of-fact defense. A mistake-of-
fact is a mistake "not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the
mistake, and consisting [of] ... an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact...."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1001 (6th ed. 1990). For the purpose of § 2252, the pertinent fact
is the age of the performers in a particular videotape.
119. Levenson, supra note 13, at 420.
120. 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 538.
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concluded that section 2251 of the Child Protection Act, the statute used
to convict the producers, was improperly drafted because it violated the
First Amendment."' But instead of invalidating it, the Ninth Circuit
created a mistake-of-age defense to save the statute.'2 The court relied
heavily upon the notion that Congress, if given the choice, would have
preferred section 2251 with a reasonable mistake-of-age defense to no
statute at all.124
The defendants in Kantor were not satisfied with this defense, and
requested that the Ninth Circuit go further and hold that the First Amend-
ment requires the government prove scienter with respect to the content of
the material.12 However, Judge Kozinski noted that "[t]hose who
arrange for minors to appear in sexually explicit materials [i.e. producers]
are in a far different position from those who merely handle the visual
images [i.e. distributors] ....,126 This suggests that the Kantor majority
felt that it was fair to place the burden of proof upon producers to prove
their honest and reasonable mistake-of-age. On the other hand, distributors
are less likely to know or have control over who is portrayed in a particular
video. Therefore, in cases involving the distribution or receipt of child
pornography, the burden to prove mens rea should be on the government.
To some, the mistake-of-age defense may be more desirable than
reading criminal negligence into section 2252 because the heavy burden of
proof would be on the defendant. 27 Others argue that the government
should only be required to prove all the factors necessary to establish a
sufficient basis to convict and punish a defendant."2 They believe that
if the government wishes to provide a mistake-of-age defense, it should be
allowed to shift the burden of proof to the defendant on that issue.1 29 Yet
others contend that the government should be required to prove every
element of an offense,1 30 because to allow convictions on less would
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id. at 542.
124. Id.
125. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543 n.6.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 13, at 410.
128. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on Which our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283, 290 n.46 (1988) (citing
as an example Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1977)).
129. Id. at 291.
130. See, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
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violate the presumption of a defendant's innocence."' This presumption
is important because the result could be that a defendant, although innocent,
may not have the ability to meet the heavy burden of proof required by a
mistake-of-age defense as Judge Kozinski seems to suggest in Kantor. In
addition, some states do not allow this type of defense because of the
increased chance for jury error and the possible incentive it creates for
defendants to take the risk of engaging in the prohibited conduct.1
32
Moreover, Judge Kozinski emphasized in X-Citement Video that
creating an affirmative defense for a statute is "something far more exotic
than just reading in a mental state element."' 33  Therefore, although
adding a mistake-of-age defense would save the statute from invalidation,
the addition of a requirement of negligence would be a fair and effective
solution.
V. THE RESULT
Unless the United States Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality
of section 2252, or Congress amends the statute, courts within the Ninth
Circuit will be powerless to convict distributors of child pornography. This
sends the message to distributors and receivers that, once again, child
pornography is a legal and profitable venture.
On August 5, 1993, this message was reinforced by the Ninth
Circuit's holding in United States v. Ruddell.1" In this case, Ruddell was
convicted under section 2252(a)(2) by a district court in Nevada for
receiving child pornography. Although Ruddell pled guilty to the charge
of receiving child pornography, the Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction
based on its ruling in X-Citement Video.'35
Unfortunately, the problems created by the Ninth Circuit's invalidation
of section 2252 are not limited to the inability to prosecute and convict
criminal acts involving the distribution and receipt of child pornography.
The Ninth Circuit recently expanded the scope of the X-Citement Video
decision to cover past convictions. In Chambers v. United States,3 6 the
Ninth Circuit decided that their decision in X-Citement Video invalidating
section 2252 should be applied retroactively. 37 As a result, Defendant-
131. Loewy, supra note 128, at 291.
132. Id.
133. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1296 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
134. 2 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1993).
135. Id.
136. 22 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 1994).
137. Id. at 941.
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Appellant Richard Chambers' July 22, 1991 conviction was reversed,
despite the fact that Chambers pled guilty to the indictment charging him
with receiving child pornography under section 2252(a)(2).1
38
The ramifications of the X-Citement Video decision are clear. Without
a statute to convict those guilty of distributing and receiving child
pornography, there is no way to further the purpose of the Child Protection
Act - to protect children. The X-Citement Video decision will revitalize
the market for child pornography. Fortunately, the revitalization will be
limited to those acting within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction, as no other
court has followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in finding section 2252
unconstitutional. 3 9 Nevertheless, after United States v. Ruddell,'4° and
Chambers v. United States,'4' it seems clear that the Ninth Circuit has no
intention of rehearing X-Citement Video en bane. As a result, section 2252
will remain unenforceable within the Ninth Circuit unless the United States
Supreme Court saves the statute and overrules X-Citement Video.
VI. CONCLUSION
Few would deny that child pornography is an evil that must be
stopped. In fact, at least one commentator believes that the importance of
preventing such an evil clearly surpasses any harm caused by section
2252.142 Nonetheless, section 2252 as written clearly has a potential
chilling effect on protected non-obscene adult pornography. However, the
Ninth Circuit's decision to invalidate the statute because of this chilling
effect was short-sighted. Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have narrowed
the statute to save it from invalidation.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "facial invalidation
is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute.., covers a whole range
of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable... conduct
.... ,I43 Section 2252 clearly fits that description. In addition, the
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 307, 311 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
§ 2252(a)(2) "includes a knowledge requirement as to the nature of the materials received or
distributed"); United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that § 2252
requires "actual knowledge or reckless disregard of a performer's minority"); United States v.
Cochran, 17 F.3d 56, 61 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding that the word "knowingly" modifies the entire
statute); United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the "X-Citement
Video opinion is something of a pariah").
140. 2 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. 22 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 1994).
142. Holl, supra note 12, at 1365.
143. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25 (1982) (citation omitted).
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Court has held that "[w]hen a federal court is dealing with a federal statute
challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid
constitutional problems . .. ."144 Hence, many believe that "[i]f a court
concludes that the [Child Protection] Act is overbroad without a scienter
requirement... it would be appropriate to add [it] ... to the statute."' 45
Although this technique would make the statute more difficult to enforce,
it would at least preserve Congress' purpose for the statute and continue to
prohibit the distribution of child pornography." By requiring that a
defendant be negligent, the statute would still have the strength to be
enforceable, while passing First Amendment muster. A mistake-of-age
defense would also save the statute, but may encourage unfounded
prosecutions when the government knows the defendant cannot meet the
heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt his mistake-of-age.
Either way, it is clear that facial invalidation of section 2252 was
inappropriate when the result allows those guilty of intentionally distribut-
ing or receiving child pornography to avoid conviction.
Paul Fuhrman*
144. Id. at 769 n.24.
145. Strang, supra note 44, at 1790.
146. Id.
* This Note is dedicated to my mother and father. I would also like to thank the staff and
editors of the Entertainment Law Journal for their hard work and helpful suggestions.
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